A bit of a response:

--I don't think Rachel used the word "pacifist," a loaded term that implies an ideological commitment to pacifism. She spoke, I believe, of nonviolent resistance, and she explicitly and repeatedly referred to it as a "tactic." That implies there might also be other tactics.

--I agree there was a bit of a disconnect with much of what was on screen, along with Engel's report; Rachel probably should have clarified that. But the issue is not a big one: the Egyptian resistance/protest movement has clearly been overwhelmingly nonviolent. The defensive violence of the protesters does not change that fact. Moreover it is the nonviolent action that has so far had the greatest results -- it is mostly this which has pushed Mubarak's regime to the edge.

--Since the Egyptian protesters are only loosely organized and don't have an explicit philosophy or strategy of nonviolence, obviously they are not in a position to stage systematic campaigns of passive resistance a la King or Gandhi. But if they had done so, are you so sure the harm to them would have been that much worse? If the reporting on TRMS is accurate that the goal was precisely to provoke violent response and thereby justify an increased level of violent suppression by Mubarak, it would seem to follow that masses of totally passive resisters would likely have sapped the will of Mubarak's people more quickly than actually occurred. And given the regime's evident failure to put blinders on the eyes of the whole world, the violence against the protesters likely did not escalate only because of international pressure (and surely also because of internal pressure from the Egyptian military) -- not because Mubarak was afraid his forces would be defeated in a violent confrontation.

--In Iran, nonviolent protest came closer to achieving real change than anything else has done in the life of the regime there. If you want to be objective about this, I challenge you to compare the degree of success of violent vs. nonviolent uprisings against the Iranian government -- who has come closer to winning? Have violent resisters ever had any degree of success there?

--Rachel did not claim that nonviolence is the only legitimate tactic in all times and places. Given her well-established history of enthusiasm for big machines that turn humans into dogfood, it would be unlikely for her to do so. She simply made a point that you are ignoring: when you are opposing people whose guns are much, much bigger than yours, you're a fool to fight them using guns. I would add that such a violent response can have only two consequences: massacre or civil war. Rachel was observing the use of nonviolent tactics (observing, not commanding or advising) and drawing conclusions from that about why it's happening and what it means.

--Finally, I would just ask: how's violence working out these days as a response to evil? I'd love to see some great examples of intensely violent campaigns that are succeeding or have succeeded -- whether by state actors or popular resistance groups. My suspicion is that such campaigns virtually always succeed only in either of two things: increased authoritarianism or increased factionalism leading often enough to civil wars and similar things. But hey, prove me wrong.

What Frank said.

--The TRMS segment was labeled "Strategy and Tactics" on the screen. Maybe Rachel called non-violence only a "tactic," but she clearly was suggesting that the non-violent "passive", "stoic" resistance of the black civil rights movement, as displayed in video on the show, should be used by the demonstrators in Egypt. This advice was a-historical and the "tactic" is in fact not applicable to the situation in Egypt.

--One must speak to the concrete situation to clinch one's point, and the fact that Rachel simply ignored the facts as presented by Richard Engel suggests she did not have an answer to that particular situation. Therefore her suggestions could not relate to people on the ground in Cairo.

--You say Iran's 2009 "nonviolent protest came closer to achieving real change than anything else has done" under that regime. Well, in historic battles "close" is not good enough--a single bloody defeat could set you back for years.

You might review how the Shah was overthrown: after massive street demonstrations forced the Shah to flee, there was a final violent confrontation in the streets between guerrillas and mutinous soldiers on one side, fighting against the Shah's Praetorian guard on the other side. The latter was shattered in battle, thereby destroying the old regime. What happened afterward depended on a contest between the various social elements (the bazaar, clergy, labor, students), a struggle too long to describe here and not relevant to this discussion.

--the question of what tactics to use by mass movements can only be decided by analyzing the concrete situation at any given moment. Yes, unarmed masses cannot confront a highly trained and motivated army, but in this particular case the army was fractured and unwilling to use violence against the people. In this situation, a hastily armed crowd can challenge a bunch of gangsters and disorganized police in the street, as the "battle of Tahrir" just proved to you before your very eyes!

But it seems you refuse to believe your own lying eyes...

The fact is the course of mass struggles are often decided by a single moment of battle, and I don't think it can be challenged that if the people in Tahrir Square had not fought that day and night, they would have been slaughtered and the whole movement likely would have become terrified and demoralized, and dispersed. By fighting, they now retain the possibility of completing the overthrow of the Mubarak regime.

I really think our knowledge of what happened during the Battle of Tahrir is too limited at this point to make any definitive conclusions. From what I've seen it looks like a fairly small number of men attacked the crowds, and many in the crowds responded by doing what they could to defend themselves. Given the limitations on journalists, and the nature of journalism, any conclusions we make beyond that is to some extent speculation. But it seems likely the attackers were sent there by people in Mubarak's regime, and it also seems likely that the defensive actions of the crowd succeeded to a significant degree in repulsing the attackers. I think we can agree at least on that much.

We seem to disagree on the intended purpose of the attack. You say, if I understand you correctly, that the attackers wanted to murder the protesters -- as many as possible, I assume. TRMS and I believe the attackers wanted to provoke a violent response so as to justify a harsher crackdown. Both these positions might be wrong -- maybe the attackers really wanted to inflict just enough damage to intimidate the protesters into staying home. Or maybe they really were just freelance Mubarak enthusiasts enraged by the protesters' demands.

Areas of real puzzlement are these: why didn't the attackers increase their firepower against the protesters, especially after the protesters fought back? Or the next day: why didn't the attackers regroup and attack again? What was the role of the military?

The differing answers we give to these variables, and the weight we give to each variable, seems to determine how we interpret the events. That's why I can't go along with you in saying that your conclusions stem directly from what you saw on the screen. It's just not that obvious -- not to anyone. And if you think it is, you're probably deceiving yourself. No one is in a position of pure objectivity here, including the tv cameras.

So was the "Battle of Tahrir" strictly a "battle" in which the attackers were repulsed by the defensive tactics of the protesters, plain and simple? Not if the goal of the attackers was something other than strict military victory over the protesters (we don't know what their goal was). Not if the attackers intentionally limited the use of force for political or other reasons (we don't know why they didn't use stronger tactics, nor we do know if their falling back was itself a delaying tactic to be followed later by a stronger show of force).

But IF the attackers' goal was to provoke the protesters into violence (as TRMS claimed), it seems they succeeded. You haven't argued against this interpretation, so I wonder what you make of it. It's a paradox: the attackers apparently succeeded in their goal, yet the protesters were victorious in the battle.

I would have expected that "victory" to be followed by a worse attack, but so far it hasn't happened -- so I speculate that that was because other parts of Mubarak's strategy failed, and he experienced too much pressure from his military and the rest of the world. But your interpretation is the attackers were simply defeated through the violence of the defenders, and no longer believe they can achieve a violent victory. Given Mubarak's ruthlessness, to me that seems implausible.

By the way, I'm not denying that in that concrete situation, the protesters' actions did succeed. Apparently it did -- or maybe the attackers, having achieved their goal, deliberately fell back in the hope that the "defense" would turn into a riot. I don't know, but this interpretation is not the only possible or plausible one. It certainly is not obvious that the attackers were nothing but "gangsters and disorganized police" -- my impression from the reporting I've heard is that they were organized (more or less) and were sent there for a purpose. Certainly they would have lost whatever degree of organization they had at the start as the melee ensued: but maybe that was itself part of the plan.

Finally, when you say the protesters would have been "slaughtered" if they'd used nonviolent tactics, you're speculating. And your speculations are only as good as the facts and assumptions on which they're based -- but you don't make it clear what is the basis for your speculation. You simply appear to take it for granted that when one group of people attacks another, they will escalate their attack until stopped; therefore if not stopped, they will kill, and keep on killing. That assumption ought to be questioned. This doesn't mean it would have been solely a nonviolent tactic that stopped the violence -- maybe the attackers never intended, or were never willing, to engage in slaughter in the first place. You don't know. I don't know. A little humility regarding your own certainty would be useful in this case.

PS Sorry to be so longwinded. I'll shut up now.

I think we can draw some conclusions about the battle of Tahrir Square.

The attackers were sent by the regime. I've read various reports that many of them were carrying police IDs (we know because demonstrators fought back and captured them), while others were released prisoners who were paid. The defenders of Tahrir Square did indeed repulse their attacks.

The purpose of the attacks was to create an atmosphere of chaos and fear in order to intimidate the demonstrators, and the Egyptian people. However, owing to the determination and courage of the demonstrators, and the unwavering support for them by the vast majority of Egyptians, the regime failed in its purpose.

The attackers didn't attack again because they were demoralized by the resistance they encountered. The military seems to be paralyzed--those at the top are part of the ruling clique (Mubarak was an air force general), but they aren't confident that their soldiers--especially the poor conscripts, who've been mingling with the demonstrators for many days now--would follow an order to fire on those demonstrators.

There's no paradox here. The attackers failed to achieve their goal. The defenders of Tahrir Square were victorious.

But what we're witnessing is a revolution. Many more struggles, taking different forms, lie ahead.

People with a dogmatic attachment to "nonviolence" in all situations have an unhealthy desire to be martyrs, IMNSHO. Rigid pacifism is an idea whose time has gone. Too many people in the US forget that the black civil rights movement achieved the sucesses it did in large part because resistance to integration and black civil rights became an international public relations disaster for the US.

But space WAS found for the David Kato story! At least I saw it on the podcast -- just before the Packers story.

Prayer Breakfast was Thursday.

LGBT activists did question his appearance and protest in relation to Uganda and David Kato, but I didn't think about it until after the fact.

Pao was a hero, deserves our recognition and respect, and is one of the people that should be loudly included in the history of our involvement in SE Asia. He and the Hmong people that aided the United States.

Go ask 10 people...100 people...a 1000, if you prefer. No one will know who he is, or remember what he did. THAT is the shame for America, not where he is buried.

Forgot to include this link, for a little more information on Pao and his people in the US.

Forgot to include this link, for a little more info on the funeral and Pao and his people in the US.

This blog really sucks. It won't take the link, and it won't just delete the post. Someone fix this messed-up machine!

angeleno - I believe you need to request permission to post links from Newsvine.

Here is a link to a story about Vang Pao.

http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/02/05/general.hmong/